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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court waited until the last day of its October 2015 Term to 
issue an opinion in McDonnell v. United States.1 One can almost imagine the 
chagrinned Justices not wanting to stick around for the reaction of an 
increasingly cynical public: money buys votes and money buys action; 
government of the people, by the people, and for the people is no more. 
Indeed, the case ends with an unusual sort of elegy: “There is no doubt that 
this case is distasteful; it may be worse than that. But . . . .”2 
Could it be that the Court, still battered by two decisions that many 
continue to feel were more baldly political than most,3 was embarrassed by 
this latest decision?4 Probably not. The Chief Justice wrote the McDonnell 
decision on behalf of a unanimous Court. The indicia of raw politics from 
 
† Associate Professor, University of Toledo College of Law. A.B., Stanford University; J.D., 
Columbia Law School. This Essay is better than it would have been thanks to comments from Jeffrey 
Bellin and Evan Zoldan. Thanks also to the editors at the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 
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1 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016). 
2 Id. at 2375. 
3 This statement refers to Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), and Citizens United v. FEC, 558 
U.S. 310 (2010). 
4 Dahlia Lithwick captures this sentiment nicely, writing, “[W]hen the entire public is more 
and more convinced—thanks in part to the court’s ruling in Citizens United—that business as usual 
in government consists of millionaires buying access to their elected officials, it’s not clear that the 
court’s best and most savvy response should be to rule unanimously that since this is merely how 
government is done we should all stop calling it corruption.” Dahlia Lithwick, Entry 21: Dietary 
Supplement Peddlers: They’re Just Like You and Me , SLATE (June 27, 2016, 7:25 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_breakfast_table/features/2016/supreme_court
_breakfast_table_for_june_2016/the_bob_mcdonnell_ruling_resulted_in_some_absurd_analogies.h
tml [https://perma.cc/FQ2S-9CWE]. 
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those earlier cases are absent. No doubt, the behavior at issue in McDonnell is 
shameful, but the shame rests with lax state regulations and those enticed by 
lucre, not with the Court. 
Predictably, the decision has been received with some degree of panic.5 
Corruption is never popular, and the ruling will make it more difficult to 
prosecute. But claims that federal corruption laws are dead are overstated. 
This Essay examines the McDonnell opinion in light of corruption law 
generally and identifies avenues by which corruption can, and will continue 
to be, prosecuted. Indeed, while McDonnell narrows the path, it also adds 
some clarity to the difficult nexus between free speech, free elections, 
representative government, and bribery. 
II. MCDONNELL AND THE VERY FINE LINE BETWEEN  
INFLUENCE AND PRESSURE 
A. The Background of McDonnell v. United States 
Robert McDonnell was elected the seventy-first Governor of Virginia on 
a platform of improving economic development and at a time of personal 
financial distress.6 The two circumstances dovetailed as the Governor found 
a way to mitigate his own financial distress while simultaneously advocating 
for the platform that put him in office. Star Scientific, Inc. (“Star”), a Virginia 
company founded and led by Jonnie Williams, had developed a dietary 
supplement based on a component of tobacco plants.7 The company desired 
FDA classification as a pharmaceutical because it would greatly enhance its 
profitability.8 However, it lacked the resources to fund the extensive studies 
required for such approval.9 
Shortly after the election, Jonnie Williams approached the new Governor, 
seeking help in convincing state agencies and research universities to conduct 
the necessary studies.10 Williams also enlisted the help of McDonnell’s wife, 
who would eventually be indicted and tried alongside her husband.11 Over the 
next three years, Williams lavished the gubernatorial family with gifts, 
 
5 See, e.g., Amy Davidson, The Supreme Court’s Bribery-Blessing McDonnell Decision, THE NEW YORKER 
(June 27, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/news/amy-davidson/the-supreme-courts-bribery-blessing-
mcdonnell-decision [https://perma.cc/YE92-QDS4] (“The Court, in Citizens United and now in McDonnell, 
has looked upon the worst, most endemically corrupt aspects of American politics and enshrined them.”). 
6 United States v. McDonnell, 792 F.3d 478, 486 (4th Cir. 2015). The Fourth Circuit decision, overruled 
by the Supreme Court, presents a far more detailed, and hence more disturbing, factual background. 
7 Id. at 487. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 487-93. 
11 Id. 
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including the use of a private plane, cognac priced like tuition, haute couture, 
Ferrari privileges, an engraved Rolex, and much-needed loans.12 “In total, 
Williams gave the McDonnells over $175,000 in gifts and loans.”13 McDonnell, 
in turn, made efforts to help Williams and Star secure the state-sponsored 
study needed for FDA approval. These efforts included arranging meetings 
with relevant public officials, hosting and attending events at the Governor’s 
Mansion designed to encourage the studies, and allowing private access to 
the Governor’s Mansion to promote the studies.14 
A jury convicted McDonnell of honest services fraud and Hobbs Act 
extortion.15 In doing so, the jury found that the Governor had offered his 
assistance “in exchange for” Williams’s gifts.16 This was bribery in common 
parlance. Distasteful, no doubt, and definitely a quid pro quo. And the 
Supreme Court vacated the convictions without altering any of these 
findings. The basis for the Court’s holding was that the quo did not count. 
Or, more precisely, it was that we don’t know whether the quo counted 
because the trial court defined it too broadly.17 
In his influential book Bribes, John Noonan wrote that “[t]he core of the 
concept of a bribe is an inducement improperly influencing the performance 
of a public function meant to be gratuitously exercised.”18 Although this core 
definition remains consistent across cultures, Noonan wrote that the scope of 
each term varies greatly.19 The Court in McDonnell introduced a limit on what 
counts as a public function meant to be gratuitously exercised. 
B. The Meaning of “Official Act” 
1. The Court’s Reasoning 
Most corruption statutes forbid public officials from receiving or 
demanding a thing of value, with corrupt intent, in exchange for being 
influenced in the performance of an official act.20 In McDonnell, the trial court 
 
12 Id. 
13 McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2016). 
14 Id. at 2365-66. 
15 Id. at 2366. 
16 Id. 
17 See id. at 2372 (criticizing and rejecting the broad understanding of what “counts as a quo”). 
18 JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES: THE INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF A MORAL IDEA, at xi (1984). 
19 Id. 
20 Following Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010), the parties in McDonnell agreed to 
“define honest services fraud with reference to the federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201.” 
McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2365. Similarly, the Hobbs Act charges were based on allegations of bribery. 
Id. Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) establishes a felony if a public official: 
(2) . . . directly or indirectly, corruptly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive 
or accept anything of value personally or for any other person or entity, in return for: 
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instructed the jury that the term “official act” includes “acts that a public 
official customarily performs,” including acts “in furtherance of longer-term 
goals” or “in a series of steps to exercise influence or achieve an end.”21 
McDonnell argued on appeal that this definition was too broad, while the 
Government urged the Court to embrace a broad reading of “official act” by 
reference to the broad definitional language: “any decision or action, on any 
question or matter, that may at any time be pending, or which may by law be 
brought before any public official, in such official’s official capacity.”22 The 
Supreme Court rejected the Government’s argument and ruled that the trial 
court’s definitions were too broad, as they risked rendering the “official act” 
element superfluous by capturing “nearly any activity by a public official.”23 
To isolate those public functions that do constitute “official acts” under 
federal corruption law, the Court identified two definitional components. First, 
there must be “a question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy that 
may at any time be pending or may by law be brought before a public official.”24 
Second, the official must have taken action on that “question, matter, cause, 
suit, proceeding or controversy.”25 The Court then suggested that the question 
is whether the alleged meetings, contacts, or events at issue in McDonnell can 
satisfy either prong.26 
This is a strange inquiry because there is really no reason to consider 
whether the actions at issue in McDonnell satisfied the first prong; the effort to 
do so is rather square peg–round hole. The Fourth Circuit took a less circuitous 
approach—eventually joined by the Supreme Court—finding that the specific 
questions about and matters of pursuing and funding state-sponsored research 
of the Star product satisfied the first prong, and the open question was simply 
whether the meetings, contacts, and events amount to decisions or actions on 
those matters.27 Considered in this manner, the issue presented was relatively 
clear. Williams paid McDonnell to support a matter that might be brought 
before a public official: namely, whether to use public funds to study the health 
benefits of Star’s product. The issue was simply whether McDonnell’s actions 
 
(A) being influenced in the performance of any official act; 
(B) being influenced to commit or aid in committing, or to collude in, or allow, any 
fraud, or make opportunity for the commission of any fraud, on the United States; or 
(C) being induced to do or omit to do any act in violation of the official duty of such 
official or person. 
21 McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2366. 
22 Id. at 2367. 
23 Id. at 2368, 2374. 
24 Id. at 2368 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 United States v. McDonnell, 792 F.3d 478, 504-13 (4th Cir. 2015). 
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after being paid should be considered within—to return to Judge Noonan’s 
phrasing—the “public function meant to be gratuitously exercised.”28 
The unhelpfulness of the two-pronged approach is thus clear: the first 
prong is satisfied (as it almost always will be), and the remaining question is 
whether the alleged acts are the right kind of acts. In McDonnell, the Supreme 
Court held that McDonnell’s acts were not—thus preserving a space within 
which public officials may act to benefit anyone for any reason, including that 
the beneficiary is a constituent, a regionally important labor interest, a 
systemically important firm, or a rich friend.29 
The tension between campaign finance laws, the First Amendment, and 
anti-corruption efforts has always been pronounced. In this case it was made 
explicit when the Court highlighted the concern that public service would be 
chilled if officials were worried about serving those who gave something of 
value in return, such as “a campaign contribution” or an invitation to “join 
[constituent homeowners] on their annual outing to the ballgame.”30 
Obviously, one of these things is not like the other; the impact of campaign 
contributions comically dwarfs any possible influence of all the ballgames, 
picnics, and barbeques in the district. However, that is a different case. 
Money in politics is the legal reality and, given that reality, the Court is right 
to be concerned about a corruption law that risks rendering criminal that 
which is legal in election law.31 This concern, that broad corruption laws are 
at odds with our system of government, undergirds the Court’s analysis. 
One implication of McDonnell is troubling: so long as the acts paid for are not 
“official acts,” public officials can be paid to perform acts as public officials—even 
to exercise influence or achieve specific ends—without it being bribery. Put 
differently, there exists a subset of public functions to be performed by public 
officials that may be sold without violating federal corruption law. 
2. The Historical Perspective and Limits on the McDonnell Limits 
The argument that less formal acts should not be brought within the ambit 
of corruption law had been made and rejected a century before in United States 
 
28 NOONAN, supra note 18, at xi. 
29 McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2372-75. 
30 Id. at 2372. 
31 In a different context, Dan Richman has speculated that calls for more prosecutions of 
corporate executives “come from those who would have preferred more regulatory controls on 
corporate behavior before 2008 and who aren’t satisfied with the regulatory response since then.” 
Daniel C. Richman, Corporate Headhunting, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 265, 280 (2014). A similar 
dynamic is likely at play in the corruption context with those who are dissatisfied with electoral 
regulations pushing for corruption prosecutions. But, using the criminal law to remedy a perceived 
regulatory failure is problematic, especially where one person’s perceived regulatory failure is 
another’s First Amendment victory. 
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v. Birdsall.32 There, the question was the legality of payments made to federal 
officers in exchange for their advising the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to 
recommend leniency for two people convicted of liquor trafficking offenses.33 
The Court rejected the argument that to count as an “official act” the function 
must be prescribed by “written rule or regulation,” holding instead that a 
broader set of activity, including functions “clearly established by settled 
practice,” constituted “official actions” for purposes of defining bribery.34 
The Court again confronted the definition of “official act” in United States 
v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California.35 Although the case involved the federal 
gratuity statute, that statute shares the same definition of “official act” as the 
bribery statute.36 In Sun-Diamond, the Court specifically addressed the intent 
component of the corruption statutes, noting that bribery requires intent to 
influence through a quid pro quo, whereas gratuities require merely “a reward 
for some future act that the public official will take (and may already have 
determined to take), or for a past act that he has already taken.”37 The key to 
illegal gratuities, however, is that the reward must be for a specific and known 
act. It is not illegal to reward a public official “to build a reservoir of goodwill 
that might ultimately affect one or more of a multitude of unspecified acts, 
now and in the future.”38 The Court supported this conclusion, in part, by 
describing the strange results if intent to build goodwill were a sufficient basis 
for charging an illegal gratuity: sports teams gifting the President a jersey at a 
celebratory White House visit could be guilty of engaging in criminal conduct.39 
It is important to recognize these examples from Sun-Diamond for what 
they are and what they are not. They are examples of gifting scenarios in 
which neither the giver nor the recipient is linking the gift to any specific act 
by the recipient. They are examples of the absence of mens rea.40 They are 
not examples of events that, by their nature, cannot constitute official acts in 
the bribery and gratuity context. The Fourth Circuit made this point in 
rejecting McDonnell’s argument, and it is worth quoting because it holds true 
even after the Fourth Circuit was reversed by the Supreme Court: 
The Sun-Diamond Court did not rule that receptions, public appearances, and 
speeches can never constitute “official acts” within the meaning of § 201(a)(3); 
 
32 233 U.S. 223 (1914). 
33 Id. at 229-30. 
34 Id. at 231. 
35 526 U.S. 398 (1999). 
36 Id. at 404. 
37 Id. at 404-05. 
38 Id. at 405. 
39 Id. at 406-07. 
40 In the language of federal bribery law, these are examples where the giving is not done 
“corruptly.” See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b). 
2016] Corruption Law After McDonnell: Not Dead Yet 17 
the Court’s point was that job functions of a strictly ceremonial or educational 
nature will rarely, if ever, fall within this definition.41 
Some, no doubt, will read the Supreme Court’s decision in McDonnell as 
establishing a rule that setting up meetings and hosting events can never 
constitute “official acts” for purposes of our corruption laws; and, accordingly, 
meetings and events can be sold to the highest bidder without running afoul 
of federal corruption laws.42 This, however, is not the rule established by 
McDonnell: it remains the case that meetings, public appearances, and 
speeches can constitute official action, but they rarely, if ever, will if they are 
of a strictly ceremonial or educational nature. 
The Supreme Court wrote that “hosting an event, meeting with other 
officials, or speaking with interested parties is not, standing alone, a ‘decision 
or action’ within the meaning of § 201(a)(3), even if the event, meeting, or 
speech is related to a pending question or matter.”43 Consequently, even 
expressing support for [a particular policy] at a meeting, event, or call . . . does 
not qualify as a decision or action on the [policy], as long as the public official 
does not intend to exert pressure on another official or provide advice, 
knowing or intending such advice to form the basis for an “official act.”44 
This statement, which might be mistaken as the death knell for corruption 
law, includes critical qualifying language mapping the future of anti-corruption 
prosecutions. It’s about intent. 
III. CORRUPTION, INFLUENCE, AND INTENT 
McDonnell arranged meetings, hosted and attended events, and encouraged 
state officials to consider conducting public studies of Star’s dietary supplement 
in exchange for gifts and loans worth nearly two-hundred-thousand dollars.45 His 
conviction was vacated because it was predicated on an overbroad definition 
of official acts.46 
Meetings, calls, and events, “standing alone” are not enough.47 It remains 
possible, however, to premise a violation of federal bribery statutes on 
meetings, calls, and events where those actions are performed with intent “to 
 
41 United States v. McDonnell, 792 F.3d 478, 508 (4th Cir. 2015). 
42 State regulations and ethics rules remain a distinct matter. 
43 McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2370 (2016). 
44 Id. at 2371 (emphasis added). 
45 Id. at 2361-67. This statement is predicated on the jury verdict, and that introduces a bit of 
uncertainty. The jury returned only a general verdict of guilt, and accordingly, it is possible that they 
found certain, but not all, of the alleged acts to have been performed in exchange for the gifts. 
46 See id. at 2375 (“Because the jury was not correctly instructed on the meaning of ‘official act,’ 
it may have convicted Governor McDonnell for conduct that is not unlawful.”). 
47 Id. at 2366. 
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exert pressure on another official or provide advice, knowing or intending 
such advice to form the basis for an ‘official act.’”48 
One strange result of McDonnell is that it defines the “official act” element 
of federal bribery law in part by reference to a mens rea standard. This is 
particularly odd given that the bribery law already includes a mens rea 
element: “corruptly.”49 “Corruptly,” however, is an unusual and poorly defined 
mindset that fails classification within the normal purpose, knowledge, 
recklessness, or negligence hierarchy. Far clearer is the standard set forth in 
McDonnell: intent to exert pressure.50 
Corruption law is not dead; it has been narrowed and clarified. May a 
public official accept gifts in exchange for arranging a meeting with officials 
empowered with deciding a key issue? Sure. May she accept gifts in exchange 
for giving a speech in favor of that issue? Yes. May she even host an event to 
advocate in favor of the issue, in exchange for gifts? She may. 
What she cannot do, however, is perform any of these actions with the 
intent to pressure other officials into making a particular decision. At first, 
this distinction appears elusive. Why advocate if not to prevail? Does not the 
very act of arranging a meeting, giving a speech, or hosting an event suggest 
the official intends to pressure others into supporting her position? It does 
not. It does suggest that she hopes to prevail—but not necessarily by pressure. 
She may intend to prevail by influencing others. Pressure or influence? This 
is the line between corruption and politics left by McDonnell. Pressure is 
impermissible; influence is not.51 The line is undoubtedly problematic. But 
many of the problems are rooted in election and campaign finance law, not 
our criminal justice system. And, it is a line that prosecutors can navigate, 
maintaining a role for federal corruption law going forward. 
 
48 Id. at 2371. 
49 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2). 
50 The McDonnell Court included a second prong regarding advice: the term “official act” 
includes “advis[ing] another official, knowing or intending that such advice will form the basis for 
an ‘official act’ by another official.” McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2372. The Court did not further explain 
this prong. Looking only at the language of McDonnell, the advice prong has the potential to expand 
the scope of the term official act considerably. However, because the language of “advise” comes 
directly from the Birdsall case, it is best understood through those facts. There, the advice supplied 
was “contrary to the truth” and regarding an issue subject to a formal or well-established standard 
governing the eventual decision (in that case, the effect of clemency or leniency on the enforcement 
of liquor laws). United States v. Birdsall, 233 U.S. 223, 229 (1914). The advice prong thus offers at 
least two possibilities. It may provide a textual basis for expanding on the pressure prong; or, it may 
be a reluctant nod to the existence of Birdsall, acknowledging that advice can be an “official act” 
where the advice regarding an established standard is itself contrary to the truth. The latter is quite 
narrow: advice is generally a question of judgment, which makes it difficult to establish it was 
“contrary to truth” as was the case in Birdsall. 
51 Also, “advice . . . knowing or intending that such advice will form the basis for an ‘official act’ by 
another official,” is impermissible, at least where it is contrary to truth. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2370. For 
a brief comment on why the advice prong is likely to be construed narrowly, see supra note 50. 
2016] Corruption Law After McDonnell: Not Dead Yet 19 
McDonnell presents a new challenge to what might be called soft corruption 
cases, where the official act secured by payment is not the goal itself (for 
example, the decision to award a public contract or sign a particular bill), but 
rather an effort to achieve a particular goal. In these cases, the key question now 
turns on intent to pressure other officials in the performance of their duties. 
The McDonnell Court bolstered this distinction by differentiating meetings, calls, 
and events from “cause[s], suit[s], proceeding[s] or controver[ies]” as follows: 
Because a typical meeting, call, or event arranged by a public official is not of 
the same stripe as a lawsuit before a court, a determination before an agency, 
or a hearing before a committee, it does not qualify as a “question” or “matter” 
under § 201(a)(3).52 
Unlike lawsuits, agency determinations, or committee hearings, the typical 
meeting, call, or event does not formally resolve official matters. They foster 
debate and may influence others. But, they are not dispositive. The meeting, 
call, or event where a government official pressures another official into acting, 
by virtue of his or her position, is atypical.53 Where this does result, however, 
the intent to pressure renders the meeting, call, or event more like a “cause, 
suit, proceeding or controversy.”54 There is no actual effort to foster debate or 
influence. The purpose is to be dispositive through the assertion of pressure, 
nothing more. This sort of official action may not be bought, even after McDonnell. 
Indeed, the facts of McDonnell provide an example as to how the intent to 
pressure distinction might work in future prosecutions. The Supreme Court 
references a pro/con list drafted by a University of Virginia employee about 
studying the compound comprising Star’s product.55 “The first ‘pro’ was the 
‘[p]erception to [the] Governor that UVA would like to work with local 
companies,’ and the first ‘con’ was the ‘[p]olitical pressure from Governor and 
impact on future UVA requests from the Governor.’”56 The “con” is probative 
of the fact that university personnel felt pressure from the Governor, and this 
fact tends to prove that the Governor intended to exert such pressure.57 This 
is precisely the sort of evidence one should expect future corruption 
 
52 McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2369. 
53 By “atypical,” I am making only a claim about the ideal of law. Empirically it may be the 
case that many or most official decisions are made through meetings, calls, and events. The empirical 
answer likely varies between governments, agencies, and subject matters, and the net answer is 
irrelevant. The question in any one case will be whether the acting official had reason to believe that 
the meeting, call, or event would be dispositive by virtue of pressure created by her position. 
54 McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2369. 
55 Id. at 2366. 
56 Id. (alterations in original). 
57 This is only meant to be a weak statement that the evidence is probative of such intent—the 
fact that people felt pressure makes it more likely that pressure was intended than had they not felt 
pressure. It is of course not dispositive on the issue of intent. 
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prosecutions to introduce in soft corruption cases. Additionally, expect 
prosecutors to introduce evidence about the settings for meetings (to 
establish a differential power structure suggestive of pressure), prior 
retaliatory or promotional actions based on willingness to accede to pressure, 
and other factors suggesting the paid official was putting too much bully in 
her pulpit. In the end, the key question is about intent, and it is one for the jury.58 
IV. CONCLUSION  
The “pro/con” list referenced by the Supreme Court highlights an issue 
that casts a pall across not only anticorruption efforts, but also the campaign 
finance debate. What about mixed motives? McDonnell ran and won on the 
platform of promoting business in his state. Star was a Virginia company with 
a product situated in the lucrative field between medicine and weight loss. 
Moreover, Star’s product was based on Virginia’s most iconic crop, tobacco. 
There were plenty of reasons Governor McDonnell would want to see Star 
do well, even absent the lavish treatment from Williams. Mixed motives 
undermine easy black and white distinctions, but in the corruption context 
they do not impact the “official act” or mens rea analysis. That an official acted 
for a number of different reasons goes to whether the action was performed 
“in return for” the things of value.59 
In McDonnell’s case, the verdict establishes that the jury was satisfied that 
the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt some of McDonnell’s 
actions were undertaken in return for the gifts. The open question is whether 
the actions he took amounted to merely influential meetings, calls, and events 
or efforts to pressure those with decisionmaking authority. The latter are 
corruption. This difference can be quite difficult to discern, and there are 
bound to be challenging cases in the future. But make no mistake, the 
McDonnell decision no more ends corruption prosecutions than it authorizes 
bribery. It limits their scope, and in doing so, it adds a bit of clarity. 
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58 See McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2371 (“A jury could conclude, for example, that the official [by 
having the meeting, event, or call] was attempting to pressure or advise another official on a pending 
matter. And if the official agreed to exert that pressure or give that advice in exchange for a thing of 
value, that would be illegal.”). 
59 Id. at 2365. 
